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Abstract 
 
It is widely perceived that the discovery of the New World contributed to the eventual 
downfall of Aristotelian natural philosophy.  This discovery demonstrated the unsound nature of 
Aristotle’s view that there exists an uninhabitable “torrid zone” in the area between the Tropic of 
Capricorn and the Tropic of Cancer.  It has been argued, among contemporary historians of 
science, that travels through this region of the earth created doubt in Aristotle’s authority and 
thus led people away from the sterile and bookish natural philosophy taught by scholastics.  In 
fact, during the first decades of the sixteenth century, commentators on Aristotle, such as Pietro 
Pomponazzi and Agostino Nifo, were informed, through sailors’ reports, of travels in southern 
regions and, as a result, questioned the existence of a torrid zone. Renaissance Aristotelianism 
was flexible and capable of integrating new experiences into a larger theoretical framework; 
experiential evidence that the “torrid zones” did not exist was utilized by a number of scholars 
who taught Aristotelian natural philosophy in the years after Columbus’ first crossing of the 
Atlantic Ocean. 
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Introduction 
 
Michiele Monaldi: How did it happen that Aristotle was not capable of 
knowing that the entire earth is habitable? 
Nicolò Vito di Gozze: The Philosopher could not have known this through 
natural reason; but we came to recognize all of this through experience. 
—di Gozze, 1584.
 1
 
 
 
That the scientific revolution chronologically followed upon the discovery of the New 
World is widely perceived as not coincidental.  Columbus’ voyages fundamentally shook many 
received notions among Europeans of the sixteenth century.  Encounters with previously 
unknown peoples altered conceptions of the nature of mankind; and collections of New World 
flora and fauna sparked wonder, making ancient botanical and zoological writings incomplete if 
not obsolete.
2
  It was not just that the explorations of the late-fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
revealed anomalies to accepted frameworks of knowledge, but that the New World itself was one 
huge anomaly.  In Kuhnian terms, the result of such an anomaly could not but cause a crisis in 
the accepted paradigm.  According to Reijer Hooykaas, it was the exploration of the New World 
that led to greater emphasis on “the fact” among intellectuals, which paved the way for modern 
science.
3
  Thus authorities, such as Aristotle and other ancients, ceased to be trusted, and doubt 
reigned, as evidenced by Montaigne and the renewal of Pyrrhonism, creating a vacuum of 
knowledge.  The traditional story tells us that Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, and Boyle, among 
others, filled this void by rejecting Aristotle and in his place created an experimental philosophy 
that was confirmed by mathematics and eventually reached its apotheosis in the Newtonian 
synthesis.
4
  Thus the discovery of the New World was preparatory for the scientific revolution. 
 By now, this story has been partially disassembled.  The break between traditional natural 
philosophy and those that emerged in the seventeenth century was not clean; and that the 
revolution took one century, if not two, suggests that the scientific revolution was not a rapid 
overturning of the accepted order in the same way that the American, French, and Russian 
revolutions were.
5
  Nevertheless, the belief that the emergence of modern science resulted from 
the rejection of Aristotle’s thought as the absolute truth endures.
6
  Even though a number of 
Aristotelian positions and concepts were rejected in the seventeenth century, the idea of authority 
is often misconstrued, so that Aristotelians are portrayed as defending the theories found in texts 
at all costs.  To the contrary, Aristotelianism was extremely flexible, and the rejection of one or 
more tenets was not sufficient to send the entire edifice of scholastic learning tumbling down.  
This flexibility is especially evident for the field of meteorology because it was viewed as a 
conjectural science that dealt with intractable phenomena.  Meteorological theories were seen as 
provisional and subject to reformulation.  As a result, many Renaissance university professors 
who commented on Aristotle’s Meteorology had no problem rejecting Aristotelian positions if 
experience contradicted them.  For them, authority was evidence, not the final answer. 
 A case in point regards the effect that Columbus’ voyages had in altering the conception 
of the size of the earth and its division into climatic zones.  While Columbus did not prove that 
the earth was spherical, an idea already accepted since antiquity, exploration in the New World 
called into question the extent of the habitable area of the earth.  Aristotle had addressed the 
earth’s climates in Meteorology II.5, where he argued that the terrestrial globe should be divided 
into five belts or climates that wrapped around the world’s circumference.  Assuming that the 
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borders of the climates must reflect the astronomical division of the earth, Aristotle defined the 
borders by the two tropics and the Arctic and Antarctic circles.  Two of these zones, thought to 
be habitable, were called oikoumenai; one lies in the north, between the Tropic of Cancer and the 
Arctic circle, and a corresponding region lies in the southern hemisphere.  In between the tropics, 
lies a torrid zone, too hot for the streams and pastures necessary for human life;
7
 and, in the 
extreme latitudes, both northern and southern, the cold prevents human habitation. 
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries reports from sailors about habitations along 
the coast of Africa and in the New World made the torrid zone a potential target for anti-
Aristotelians.  The readiness of some, including Columbus himself, to reject traditional 
understandings of the size of the earth and the nature of its continents is portrayed in contrast to 
the supposed hardheadedness of Aristotelians who were trapped by theory and could not adjust 
their bookish views to observational evidence.  Anthony Grafton points to the Jesuit scholar and 
traveler, Josè de Acosta, whose 1580 treatise on the New World, described his being so cold 
while traveling in the so-called torrid zone that he needed to put on more clothing.  As a result, 
he wrote: “What could I do then but laugh at Aristotle’s Meteorology and his philosophy? For in 
that place and that season, where everything, by his rules, should have scorched by the heat, I 
and my companions are cold.”
8
  De Acosta’s rejection of Aristotle supports Grafton’s claim that: 
“Between 1550 and 1650 Western thinkers ceased to believe that they could find all important 
truths in ancient books.”  De Acosta certainly was willing to challenge Aristotle’s Meteorology 
on a number of points, but his treatment of ancient authority is not as dramatic as it might appear.  
He does not present Aristotle as generally risible for his fallibility, nor did he reject Aristotle 
wholesale, but called him merely incorrect, “the author of this view [regarding the torrid zones] 
is Aristotle, great explorer of nature, but who in this case wanders far from the truth.”
9
   
 De Acosta, however, was not the first to reject the existence of torrid zones or antipodal 
habitations on the basis of experience.  A few years earlier, Francisco Sanchez wrote a far more 
scathing indictment of Aristotelian theories of the earth in his skeptical work, That Nothing is 
Known.  In his invective, Sanchez cited the common experience of travelers to New World to 
show that the theory of uninhabitable climatic zones was untenable and therefore Aristotelian 
science was incomplete and fallible: 
Yesterday you said in the light of your complete scientific knowledge - or rather, 
knowledge that was complete even long ages ago - that the entire earth was 
surrounded by the Ocean; and you divided it into three all-embracing parts, 
namely Asia, Africa, and Europe. But what are you to say today? A New World 
has been discovered - new realities - in New Spain or in the West and East Indies. 
Moreover, you used to say that the southern zone, situated below the equator, was 
uninhabitable on account of heat, but that close to the poles, and the extreme polar 
zones, the same thing was true because of the cold. Experience [experientia] has 
now shown both these statements to be false. Construct another "science," then, 
for your first is now false. So how can you maintain that your propositions are 
eternally valid, incorruptible, infallible, and incapable of being otherwise - you 
miserable worm, who scarcely know, and are scarcely even capable of knowing, 
what you are and whence you come and whiter you are going?
10
 
 
Even though Sanchez painted an entertaining picture of know-nothing scholars convinced of 
their infallibility and incapable of reacting to new observations, it must be asked whether this 
picture resembles the reality of sixteenth-century traditional natural philosophy.  Was Sanchez 
parodying fictionalized pompous schoolteachers or the cutting edge of Aristotelian natural 
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philosophy?  Moreover, before 1550, did Western thinkers really think that every important truth 
could be found in books, rather than in experience?  And, was it really not until the second-half 
of the sixteenth century that Aristotelians began to notice the discovery of the New World? 
 
The Torrid Zones: Doubt, Conjecture, and Revision 
 
While the idea of the torrid zone was widespread from antiquity through the Renaissance, 
Aristotle’s authority was hardly hegemonic.  Other ancient authors elaborated and questioned 
Aristotle’s division of the earth and his belief in two habitable zones.  Belief in a torrid zone was 
rampant, even though some ancients such as Crates of Mallos (fl. 150 A.D.) and Macrobius (5
th
 
c. A.D.) envisioned four oikoumenai.  Aristotle’s view that humans live in the southern 
hemisphere, however, found an uneven reception.  Some affirmed Aristotle’s position, and others 
considered the possibility of human life in the southern hemisphere either dubious or 
unanswerable.  For example, the geographer Strabo (ca. 63 B.C.- 23 A.D.), believing the Atlantic 
Ocean to be too large to sail across, refused to comment on the possibility of life on the 
antipodes.  On the other hand, Cicero (106-43 B.C.), in The Dream of Scipio, wrote of a different 
race of antipodal men who had no contact with those of the northern oikoumene.
11
   
Perhaps the most significant elaborations of Aristotle’s geography in late antiquity came 
in the persons of Claudius Ptolemy (85-165 A.D.), an astronomer and geographer, and Augustine 
(354-430 A.D.), a Church Father.  Using reports from travelers, Ptolemy expanded the range of 
the habitable zone and divided it into seven climates.  The northern border of the torrid zone, 
however, was not the tropic as it was for Aristotle, but the parallel on which the city Meroe lies, 
which is approximately 165/8 degrees north.  Ptolemy also contended that the polar regions are 
uninhabitable, and that the parallel which runs through Thule, an apparently mythical city, that 
was believed to be somewhere around 63 degrees north and perhaps on what are called today the 
Shetland Islands.
12
  Ptolemy’s arguments are not based on mathematics, despite his skill in that 
field, but rather are informed by histories and empirical evidence and Aristotle’s general schema.  
Like Aristotle, Ptolemy conjectured symmetry and believed that the southern hemisphere was 
habitable could be divided into the same climates as those in the north.
13
  
The division of the earth into specific zones had ramifications not just for geography and 
meteorology, but also for theology.  Augustine dismissed the belief that there was an inhabited 
southern continent and that there could exist a race of men permanently separated from the north.  
A human population on distant continents, however, presents problems for the belief in the single 
creation and common descent of all humans.  The implausibility of the navigation of oceans, 
suggests that God created counterparts to Adam and Eve in the southern hemisphere, if it is 
inhabited.  Furthermore, a just God would not create people in an area inaccessible to Christ’s 
apostles, because they would be damned as a result of unfair conditions.
14
  Thus for Augustine, 
scripture was proof that the antipodes must be free of humans. 
A melding of Augustine’s and Aristotle’s views resulted in the common medieval belief 
that there was only one inhabited zone, which corresponded to the northern orb where Europe is 
found; a torrid zone, too hot to support human life, borders the oikoumene to the south.  In the 
late Middle Ages, the Augustinian/Aristotelian position dominated conceptions of the nature of 
the earth and its climates and is found in the, Sphere of Sacrobosco, the most common 
astronomical text book of the Middle Ages, and its commentaries.  The author of this work, John 
Sacrobosco, a scholar from the late 12
th
 or early 13
th
 century, about whom little is known, 
slightly altered the placement of Ptolemy’s seven climes, agreeing that the southern border was 
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at the latitude of Meroe, but maintaining that the northern-most clime was marked by the parallel 
at 50 degrees north.  Although the text is slightly unclear, he seems to have believed that the 
southern hemisphere mirrors the northern.
15
  For Sacrobosco, these limits to the oikoumenai were 
not to be observed as strict rules.  He admitted that in the polar regions there might be islands 
and human habitations, but that the living conditions must be so bad that the area does not 
deserved the category of a clime.
16
  Michael Scot, a famed translator and scholar of the first 
decades of the thirteenth century, revised Sacrobosco’s position by adding Augustine in his 
commentary on the Sphere.  After outlining Augustine’s argument, he concluded that the 
antipodes must not be habitable, because such a proposition contradicts religion (contra fidem).
17
  
We must be careful not to ascribe too much homogeneity to either the ancient or 
medieval positions regarding the extent of the habitable earth.  Columbus read about the 
Augustinian, Aristotelian, and Sacroboscian positions in his annotated copy of Pierre d’Ailly’s 
Imago mundi and disbelieved the claim that the torrid zone was uninhabitable because of reports 
from Portuguese sailors who had crossed the equator while sailing down the western coast of 
Africa.
18
  Columbus’ disbelief, however, was probably not shocking to his contemporaries, but 
found company in highly authoritative texts.  For example, Albertus Magnus (1206-1280) cited 
reports of cities in the distant south.
19
  Pietro d’Abano’s Conciliator (ca. 1310) contains a 
detailed quaestio over the question of the habitableness of the torrid zones and areas below the 
equator, in which he discussed a plurality of views, which included accounts of very southern 
cities in India.  Pietro concluded that indeed some places in the equatorial region are 
uninhabitable and that it was not determined whether anyone lives below the equator, thus 
leaving the question open to new evidence.
20
  
 While ancient and medieval scholars questioned that the existence of an uninhabitable 
torrid zones was proven, during the Renaissance doubts grew among Aristotelian commentators, 
in part, because of the epistemological status of the field of meteorology.  Some of the leading 
Aristotelian scholars interpreted Aristotle’s Meteorology as advocating the conjectural nature of 
scientific knowledge, thereby recognizing limits to natural philosophy.  Well before de Acosta’s 
travels, leading Aristotelian commentators, such as Pietro Pomponazzi in the 1520s, noted that 
the voyages of discovery brought further doubt on the existence of torrid zones and argued that 
experience trumps the theories found in ancient texts.  For most Renaissance scholars, 
authoritative writings were sources of evidence, which at times contradicted each other as well as 
experience.  Authority in and of itself did not deliver unadulterated truth, but was an aid to 
discovering it.  A number of medieval and Renaissance Aristotelians neither feared contradicting 
Aristotle, nor thought their science was infallible.  For these scholars, the reports of sailors threw 
the existence of uninhabitable zones into doubt.  The rejection of this tenet, however, was not 
seen as fatal to natural philosophy in general and did not create a crisis that demanded a 
paradigm shift. 
 Aristotle’s philosophy provided a framework for natural philosophy in the Middle Ages 
and Renaissance.  This framework was flexible, oftentimes providing methods for inquiry rather 
than dogma.  The prohibition of metabasis is one of these guiding principles.  Based on the 
Posterior Analytics, the principle of the prohibition of metabasis contends that explanations 
should be appropriate to the phenomena that they explain, and that methods from one subject 
cannot be applied to other subjects.
21
  Thus different fields of inquiry require different methods 
and confer corresponding degrees of certainty.  For example, deductive arguments elucidate the 
nature of mathematical entities, such as lines and shapes, but cannot be applied to politics, which 
although ordered, to a degree, cannot be known with the same certainty as mathematics.  Natural 
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objects, therefore, can be known with relative degrees of certainty.  Geometry can describe 
accurately the stars and planets that have eternal regular motion.  The sublunary world, however, 
is characterized by chaotic and episodic change.  As a result, according to Aristotle, 
meteorological knowledge is hypothetical and approximate. 
 Meteorology stood out among subjects in Aristotelian natural philosophy because of its 
intractability.  For Aristotle, meteorology was not predictive but examined change in inanimate 
substances in the sublunary region.  Topics that were included in this field were: precipitation, 
rainbows, comets (which were thought to be sublunary), meteors, earthquakes, the motions of 
seas and rivers, and underground springs.  Like all of his natural philosophy, the goal of 
meteorology was to give the causes of phenomena.  Unlike for much of the natural world, 
however, the explanations for meteorology were almost entirely based on material and efficient 
cause, not the formal and final causes that were preeminent in most of his works.
22
  According to 
Aristotle, the four elements (earth, water, air, fire) compose two exhalations, one wet and 
vaporous, the other, hot and smoky, that circulate between the surface of the earth and the moon, 
which is the liminal point between terrestrial and celestial realms.  The elements and the 
exhalations are the material causes of meteorological phenomena.  The efficient cause comes 
from the motions of the celestial bodies, in particular the sun, which drives the exhalations and 
causes their transformations.  These transformed bodies remained imperfect, never truly gaining 
a new substantial form.   
Aristotle’s meteorology stressed irregular and rare phenomena, such as meteors, comets, 
floods, volcanic eruptions, and typhoons, which, because of their episodic nature, defy certain 
explanation.  He wrote: “Of these things some puzzle us, while others admit of explanation in 
some degree.”
23
  [check quotation] The theory of the dual exhalations does not derive from 
syllogistic reasoning, but from abduction, i.e., inference to the best explanation, as Cynthia 
Freeland has argued.
24
  The exhalations provide conceptual unity to a wide range of phenomena, 
that otherwise might be considered disparate.  Other ancient thinkers also noted the difficulty of 
accurately explaining meteorological phenomena; for this field both Theophrastus (d. 287 B.C.) 
and Lucretius (99-55 B.C.) gave a number of possible explanations in their meteorological 
discussions rather than a definitive account.
25
  Thus in antiquity, meteorological queries were 
frequently resolved only in a provisional manner. 
 Medieval and Renaissance meteorology took Aristotle’s Meteorology as its guide and 
starting point.  The subject of meteorology was central to Aristotelian thought.  Medieval and 
Renaissance scholars typically believed that the Meteorology was the fourth part of natural 
philosophy; it follow the Physics, De caelo, and De generatione et corruptione and preceded the 
biological and psychological works.  Scholars developed and expounded upon the subject in 
lecture courses at universities, the content of which can be known from their written 
commentaries and quaestiones derived from William of Moerbeke’s thirteenth-century Latin 
translation of the text.  Teaching of the Meteorologica was a standard part of Italian university 
curriculum at least as far back as the initial years of the fifteenth century if not earlier.  
According to the 1405 university statutes at Bologna, the Meteorology was to be taught in the 
second year as part of the classes in ordinary philosophy.
26
  Although the commentaries that 
emerged from these courses follow the text of Aristotle, they were by no means uncritical or 
unoriginal; nor were the theories developed from them so univocal to suggest that the field of 
meteorology was considered to be complete and certain, as Sanchez described it for 
Aristotelians. 
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 By the first decades of the sixteenth century, Aristotle’s own claim of puzzlement with 
regard to meteorological phenomena inspired scholars in Italy, who used the Meteorology to 
support the claim that natural philosophy was a conjectural science.  This view clearly emerged 
in the works of Agostino Nifo (1473-1538), a writer who is most noted for his participation in 
debates over the immortality of the soul and his role in advancing the so-called regressus method 
in natural philosophy, a method that combined induction and deduction, and which some 
scholars have seen to be the historical root of the “scientific method.”
27
  It is unnecessary to 
anachronistically identify the regressus theory with the modern notion of “scientific method,” to 
appreciate its sophistication, and its importance in epistemology from Galen to Galileo.  The 
theory argued that through sense perception, it was possible to establish was called quia, “the 
what there is,” or natural effects, and thus establish basic empirical truths about nature.  Using 
this knowledge as a foundation, induction led to an explanation, called the propter quid, that is, 
the “why” that gave an account for the quia.  An understanding of the propter quid, could then 
serve as a foundation for deduction of further effects, which would in term lead to the 
formulation of a more comprehensive explanation.  It was in this way that natural science was 
thought to be able to progress over time, and that natural philosophy was, to a certain degree 
conjectural.  Nifo relied on the wavering nature of the field of meteorology as evidence of the 
uncertainty of the natural sciences.    
Nifo’s Commentaria in libris Aristotelis Meteorologicis (first published in 1531, it was 
written in 1523) was the first sixteenth-century exposition on Meteorology to be published in 
Italy.  It enjoyed wide readership and went through more editions than any other commentary on 
this book in the sixteenth century.
28
  He used meteorology, and Aristotle’s confession of the 
inability to understand all causes to distinguish the natural sciences from the mathematical.  He 
writes: “It must be said that natural science is not a science simpliciter, such as the mathematical 
sciences are, but is a science that explains the why (propter quid).  [check quotation] It is the 
science of finding the causes which can be held through a conjectural syllogism, that gives the 
propter quid of the effect.”  This account of the effect however is not definitive. He supported 
this claim by his use of Aristotle’s meteorology and argued that, “Aristotle in the book of the 
Meteorology concedes that he does not provide the true causes of natural effects, but that which 
is possible through conjecture.”
29
  Thus conclusions about the causes of meteorology, unlike 
mathematics, are at best tentative, and subject to revision if there are changes in the 
understanding of the nature of meteorological effects.  For Nifo, contrary to Sanchez, 
meteorology is hardly infallible but rather open to new experiential findings. 
 Experience, during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, was far broader for natural 
philosophers than the narrow definitions of experiment that scientists have since adopted.  What 
fell under this rubric and was appropriate as evidence included not just personal observations or 
contrived tests, but also truths about the natural world that were thought to be universally agreed 
upon and experiences of others either contained in books or transmitted by word of mouth. 
Reports made by navigators and their crew, having been deemed reliable, were sufficient 
evidence for questioning and revising Aristotle.  
 Nifo’s rejection of the Aristotle’s division of the world into habitable and uninhabitable 
zones is a good example of one stage of the application of the method of regressus.  According 
to Nifo, when Aristotle claimed that the pole regions and the tropics were uninhabited he did so 
without consulting history books (historia).  Following Alexander of Aphrodisias, the 
Aristotelian commentator from the second-century A.D., Nifo claimed that perhaps in Aristotle’s 
time there were no reports that contradicted his schema.  By Nifo’s time, however, there were 
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such accounts; sailors had reported that people do live close to the North Pole, above sixty 
degrees, “thus what Aristotle attempted to establish by conjecture, is not verified by history.”
30
  
Nevertheless, Nifo maintained the rectitude of the barrenness of the torrid zone.  Even though, 
even during Alexander’s time, it was known that Ethiopians lived in this zone, the zone itself 
could not be declared habitable in a strict sense because they live, “almost beyond the norms of 
nature.”
31
  Thus Nifo rejected some of Aristotle’s conjectures because of experience, while the 
general framework persisted and the meaning of habitable zone could be interpreted so that it 
included only the regions where people could live well and not the areas where Ethiopians 
allegedly lived poorly. 
 The insistence on the conjectural nature of knowledge about the physical world, that Nifo 
held, was even stronger in the thought of his rival and contemporary Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-
1524).  Pomponazzi spent most of his professional life as first a professor at Padua and then 
Bologna.  Famed for his brushes with ecclesiastical authority, for his denial that the immortality 
of the soul could be proven philosophically, rather it was an article of faith not reason, he moved 
from a position of fideism to that of near skepticism, which runs through the lectures on 
Aristotelian text that his gave in the last years of his life at Bologna.
32
  These courses treated 
Aristotle’s biological works and the Meteorology.
33
 
Despite his more than occasional pride in uncovering what he considered to be the true 
opinion of Aristotle, Pomponazzi actively encouraged his students to doubt accepted knowledge.  
Such doubting was directed toward Aristotle and his interpreters.  His doubts primarily arose 
from contradictions among texts, interpretations, logic, and experience.  And unlike earlier 
masters of textual conciliation, Pomponazzi admitted that he could not solve all of the 
contradictions.  Furthermore, he argued that the best way to solve a number of these 
contradictions is to claim that Aristotle is wrong.  In his view, the job of the philosopher is to 
discover the truth for himself, independent from past authorities.
34
  The concept of certainty 
played scarcely any role in his meteorological commentaries, and the chosen solutions are often 
described not as true but as better, more tolerable, or more pleasing.
35
  
Pomponazzi found significant authority in Aristotle.  Authority, however, was 
conditional, and the role of the philosopher is to judge authorities, “because in philosophy,” 
Pomponazzi writes, “one should not believe an authority without reason.”
36
  The authority 
derives from Aristotle’s words themselves and the commentators should only be used with care, 
especially the works of certain unnamed commentators, who Pomponazzi believed to have put 
forth interpretations that are based on caprice and unsound readings of the text.  In his view, the 
good philosopher is aware of Aristotle’s authority, in fact, “the good philosopher should pore 
himself over Aristotle’s text,”
37
 yet uses reason to solve interpretative problems as well as to 
judge the validity of Aristotle’s arguments.  For example, after being unable to explicate 
Aristotle successfully, he urged his readers to find a solution for themselves.  He told his 
students: “Aristotle’s authority is great. And it does not seem easy to find a solution to this 
question. You consider it.”
38
 
Unquestioning acquiescence to Aristotle is not a philosophical method, according to 
Pomponazzi.  He repeatedly argued that Aristotle was human, and thus erred, like the rest of us.  
He bluntly wrote: “many want Aristotle to have spoken well with respect to everything, and they 
are stupid.”
39
  The formulae and theories that structure natural philosophy are provisional and 
should be overturned whenever experience demonstrates their failings.  He wrote: “If he 
[Aristotle] was wrong, let there be a condemnation of him.”
40
  When he finds that Aristotle has 
contradicted himself he confesses his inability to save his arguments, claiming that, “I do not 
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know how to answer except that Aristotle was a man and was capable of making mistakes.”
41
  
Rejecting all earthly authority when he found two opinions of equal value, he stated: “I believe 
neither Aristotle nor Galen knew which opinion is more true, but only God does.”
42
   
Pomponazzi’s corrections to Aristotle, and to his interpreters, most often come from 
experience, because Aristotle at times induced larger rules from an insufficient amount of 
experience.
43
  Experience for Pomponazzi was broad and not equivalent to Baconian empiricism.  
He included as experience in his meteorological work, observations taken from Plutarch’s 
histories on the existence of a man whose toe would not burn, Avicenna’s observations on the 
actions of poisonous snakes, as well his own memories of a spectacle that took place in Mantua 
when he was a child.
44
  His appeals to experience are often vague and rely on commonplaces; in 
multiple discussions he adds phrases such as “as is clear from experience” to justify or reject a 
claim.
45
   
While Pomponazzi advocated the use of reason to form philosophical positions, 
experience holds a higher position.  Citing Avicenna’s Canon and Aristotle’s Physics, he writes 
that: “When reason is contrary to experience, then reason must be thrown out and put to 
experience.”
46
  Thus, while Aristotle, at times, used an insufficient amount of evidence in 
induction, Pomponazzi, nevertheless, saw Aristotle as privileging experience over reason in 
explaining natural phenomenon.  After asking why Aristotle only puts forth only the phenomena 
without giving an explanation when he describes how honey is affected by the moist and the 
cold, Pomponazzi answers with the dictum that “it is possible to be known better through 
experience than theory.”
47
  The promotion of experiential approaches to natural philosophy is not 
foreign to Aristotle’s natural philosophy.  His use of observation, experiments, and experience is 
well documented.
48
  Pomponazzi’s emphasis on experience, however, contrasted with the 
analytic methods of many late-medieval practitioners of natural philosophy that was more often 
dependent on logic and mathematics than observation.
49
 
Given Pomponazzi’s position with respect to the epistemological roles of experience, 
authority, and theory, his take on the existence of the habitableness of the antipodes and the 
torrid zones is somewhat curious.  He prefaced his discussion by examining the Peripatetic view, 
which he claimed clearly holds that the zones between the tropics are uninhabitable.  After going 
through the arguments for this position, and pointing out their weakness, he cited a letter from 
the Venetian ambassador to Spain.
50
  According to this letter, the ambassador crossed the torrid 
zone and traveled toward the south pole, where he saw over 300 islands, discontinuous with 
continental land masses, and an “infinity of inhabited locales.”  In Pomponazzi’s opinion, the 
contents of this letter show that Aristotle’s theory is fatuous.  Moreover, this experiential 
evidence suggests that other parts of natural philosophy, such as astronomy, are monuments to 
human vanity rather than certainty, “the desire of glory and attention leads us to say things about 
the heavens, when we are ignorant of even the terrestrial regions.”
51
  If natural philosophy errs 
with respect to subjects in our proximity, such as meteorological phenomena, it is even less 
likely that we can know with certainty about the composition of the distant celestial realm. 
 Given this assessment, it would seem that whether the torrid zones and antipodes are 
inhabited would be an open-and-shut case.  For Pomponazzi, however, there was one strong 
argument that humans did not live in these regions, namely the authority of Augustine.
52
  Even 
though, philosophers’ sense experience contradicts Augustine’s position, Pomponazzi could not 
bring himself to directly reject the Church Father.  After rejecting the potential solution that 
because these inhabitants are wild and without discipline, they should be damned as lacking in 
sense, he confessed that he could not solve the dilemma and refused to reject Augustine.  His 
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reasons have his personal history behind him. In 1518, his teachings on the immortality of the 
soul were condemned by the Church, which, at the time, was heavily influenced by 
Augustinians.
53
  Pomponazzi recanted and agreed not to teach arguments that might be construed 
to deny the personal immortality of the soul.  In explaining his refusal to disagree with 
Augustine, he mentioned his skirmish with the Church, writing that the position for which he 
was declared in error was “fatuous” and claimed that when it “comes to issues of faith, I always 
subject myself to Priests and whatever they tell me.”  As a result, he offers no definitive solution 
since he “does not know how the Priests solve this argument.”
54
 
 Scholars have more than once charged Pomponazzi with deception in his deference to the 
Church, because of his presentation of coherent arguments for a position antithetical to Church 
doctrine, which is followed in a later chapter by a denial of the ability of philosophy to answer 
the same question, because it was a matter of faith.
55
  These charges are problematic because of 
their assumption of Pomponazzi’s heterodoxy and their transference of modern anti-clerical 
attitudes to the Renaissance.
56
  It is more than reasonable (and common among medieval 
Christian theologians) to believe that the personal immortality of the soul or the creation of the 
universe can be known only through faith.
57
  One wonders, however, to what extent this fideism 
is possible with the issue of the habitability of the antipodes and torrid zones.  Even though once 
experience shows that these zones are inhabited, there seems little else to do but not interpret 
Augustine as being literally true, but it is not necessary to accuse Pomponazzi of 
disingenuousness.  Given that he was a layman, Pomponazzi was most likely correct in claiming 
making such interpretation was not his business, but that of priests.  Pomponazzi, a philosopher 
untrained in theology, ignorant of their solution, thus refused to make more pronouncements on 
how to solve a theological question.  Nonetheless, it is easy to suspect that Pomponazzi was a bit 
gleeful that the Augustinians, who by the 1520s had fallen out of favor in Rome because of 
Martin Luther, a former Augustinian monk, would be forced to perform some exegetical 
acrobatics in order to save the coherency of Augustine’s pronouncements.  Even Augustinians, 
however, did not seem to be overly concerned with maintaining a literal interpretation of 
Augustine.  During the sixteenth century numerous Augustinian monks traveled to the New 
World and Asia as missionaries.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Later Aristotelians followed Nifo’s and Pomponazzi’s rejection of Aristotle’s conjecture 
of uninhabitable regions.  Francesco Vimercati, originally from Milan but later a professor of 
Greek and the College Royale, in Paris, noted, in his 1556 commentary on the Meteorology, that 
the torrid regions, the southern hemisphere, and the northern polar regions were inhabited.  He 
wrote that these locals were discovered after the time of Ptolemy and Aristotle, but are readily 
recognized by more recent geographers.
58
  The most common Jesuit textbooks on natural 
philosophy, those by the Coimbrans, which were commentaries on Aristotle as well, citing 
Christopher Columbus by name, gave a six-prong explanation of why the torrid zones were 
indeed habitable: the equal nights and days prevented excessive warming, the areas were full of 
vapors and therefore cooling rains, God endowed the primeval earth in such a way as to make 
them cool enough to support human life, they were full of mountains and valley, the oceans cool 
them, and winds, which have their ultimate source in God’s providence, disperse the heat of the 
sun.
59
  The Jesuit order, at this time, was both a starch defender of Aristotle and a promoter of 
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worldwide voyages and missions.  The experiences derived from the discovery of the New 
World, however, were stronger than maintaining a strict adherence to Aristotle’s authority. 
 When compared to later debates over the mutability of the heavens and the location of 
comets, it does not appear that writers of Aristotelian commentaries had much trouble 
relinquishing Aristotle’s position at all.
60
  This willingness to go against Aristotle is due to the 
lack of ambiguity of the evidence that these zones were inhabited.  While the telescope could be 
doubted as an inaccurate instrument, providing distortions of experience rather than 
enhancement,
61
 and disputes over the application of mathematics to the physical world provoked 
questions about the conclusions made by Tycho Brahe and Galileo,
62
 by the middle of the 
sixteenth century it would have been impossible to deny the numerous claims made by sailors 
who had seen the New World.  Moreover, Aristotle’s position had been a matter of debate within 
the Aristotelian tradition since antiquity; it was not a central tenet and thus was subject to 
revision. 
 Jacopo Zabarella, a leading professor at Padua, believed that Aristotelian natural 
philosophy, despite Aristotle’s being fallible, attained perfection with regard to its structure and 
form, that is, its general principles and methods, but not with regard to its characterization of all 
natural things.
63
  Geocentricism, supralunary comets, mutations in the heavens each, to a great 
extent, threatened the form and structure of the Aristotelian cosmos, by rendering key doctrines, 
such as the distinction between the supralunary and sublunary, the relativity of direction, the 
relation between celestial powers and earth, as meaningless.  To the contrary, Aristotle’s 
conjectures about geographic regions, about which he knew nothing firsthand, provoked laughter 
in de Acosta and scorn in Sanchez, were not part of the structure and form of his account of the 
natural world but rather a description of some of its contents, which could be revised without 
throwing general principles in doubt.  Although the inhabitability of the torrid zones was 
rejected, the belief in the existence of climates that affected persons, peoples, and animal species 
persisted.  As late as the 18
th
 century, Montesquieu endorsed the theory that climate affects 
government and mores in his Spirit of the Laws, and Thomas Jefferson felt obliged to use the 
phrase “torrid zone” to describe the natural habitat of wooly mammoths and elephants.
64
  
Renaissance Aristotelians, such as Pomponazzi and Nifo, were more than willing to revise 
Aristotle.  His authority was not absolute, but merely the best guide available; and well before 
1550, scholars thought that not all important truths, such as the earth’s climate, were to be found 
only by reading texts. 
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